NO:

Department of State



35-M

SECRET

Action

SUR

FROM: MOSCOW

Control: 19471 Rec'd:

JUNE 26, 1959

10:43 AM

info SS

SP

TO: Secretary of State

2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

INR H

SENT DEPARTMENT 2665, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 425, BONN 339, LONDON 443.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION RMR

> FOLL LUNCHEON FOR HARRIMAN YESTERDAY HE, KHRUSHCHEV, KOZLOV, MIKOYAN, GRUMYKO AND I HAD NEARLY TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WHICH CENTERED MOSTLY ON GERMANY AND BERLIN FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS; FULL TEXT BY DESPATCH.

ARHRUSHCHEV WAS SERIOUS BUT GENIAL AND REPEATEDLY ASSERTED HIS DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH US. HE SUGGESTED WE SHOULD DRAW APPROPRIATE LESSONS FROM HISTORY WHICH US DID NOT APPRECIATE AS MUCH AS SOVIET UNION WHICH HAD TWICE BEEN INVADED BY GERMANY. I REPLIED HISTORIC LESSON WE DREW WAS THAT WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT ERROR FOLLOWING FIRST WORLD WAR OF GIVING GERMANY GROUNDS FOR THINKING SHE WAS BEING MISTREATED. KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE WAS NOT IMPRESSED BY THIS ARGUMENT. HE EXPRESSED HIS CONTEMPT FOR ADENAUER WHO HAD TRUED TO FLATTER HIM AND WAS IRYING TO STIR UP TROUBLE NOT ONLY BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND WEST BUT ALSO BETWEEN WESTERN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND BRITAIN. 🚊 SAID OUR EXPERIENCE WITH ADENAUER HAD SHOWN GENUINELY WANTED TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF GERMAN MICITARISM AND HAD WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTED PLANSIFOR * EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WHICH WOULD PREVENT THIS. WE MUST FACE GERMAN PROBLEM SERIOUSLY AND RECOGNIZE THAT ULBRICHT AND ADENAUER COULD NEVER AGREE. WEST WOULD NEVER CONSENT TO A COMMUNIST GERMANY AND HE WOULD NEVER AGREE TO ADENAUER'S ABSORBING EAST GERMANY. WAS TO CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY AND LIQUIDATE REMAINS

SECRET

WHEN I POINTED OUT WE HAD RECOGNIZED PRESENT

SITUATION

PERMANENT RECORD COPY . This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with n

DECLASSIFIED


NARA, Data

-2-2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW

SITUATION BY PROVIDING FOR A PHASED PLAN HE SAID WE HAD ALLOWED 2 AND ONEHALF YEARS WHEREAS HE WOULD PREFER 250 YEARS. WHEN GROMYKO POINTED OUT OUR PEAN BASED ON ELECTIONS KHRUSHCHEV SAID WEST WOULD NOT ALLOW VIETNAM TO BE ABSORBED THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS AND HOW COULD WE EXPECT SOVIET UNION TO ALLOW ADENAUER TO ABSORB FOR MORE IMPORTANT AREA OF EAST GERMANY. IT WAS CLEAR THAT A REUNITED GERMANY WOULD JOIN NATO. WEST WANTED THEM TO ALLOW GREATER POPULATION OF WEST GERMANY TO DECIDE ISSUE. HE HAD NO GOOD ANSWER TO MY ARGUMENT THAT OUR PLAN PROVIDED FOR POSSIBILITY SEPARATE VOTE IN TWO PARTS OF GERMANY. KHRUSHCHEV ASKED ME IF WE WOULD EVER ALLOW WEST GERMANY TO OPT FOR SOCIALISM. I SAID HE WOULD DOUBTLESS NOT BELIEVE ME BUT I WAS SURE THAT IF WEST GERMANY TOOK SUCH A DECISION IN A SUPERVISED ELECTION THAT WAS NOT UNDER PRESSURE OF THREATS, WE WOULD ABIDE BY THE DECISION. KHRUSHCHEV SAID I HAD BEST BE CAREFUL AND WAS I SO SURE THAT THIS MIGHT NOT ONE DAY HAPPEN AFTER SOVIETS HAD CONTINUED TO IMPROVE THEIR OWN ECONOMIC POSITION AND STANDARD OF LIVING IN EAST GERMANY HAD BEEN RAISED. HE SAID THAT ADENAUER DID NOT WANT GERMAN REUNIFICATION FOR FEAR GERMANY WOULD GO SOCIALIST.

KHRUSHCHEV SAID IT WAS CLEAR GERMAN QUESTION COULD NOT BE SETTLED NOW AND HE HAD THEREFORE PUT FORWARD HIS BERLIN PROPOSAL. HE HAD DEVELOPED THE FREE CITY SOLUTION PERSONALLY ALTHOUGH HIS ASSOCIATES AGREED WITH HIM. HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE ALMOST ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE FOR THE FREE CITY. HE EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE THAT SOVIET GOVT WHICH CAME TO POWER AFTER DEATH OF STALIN ATTACHED TO KEEPING ITS WORD AND THAT IT WOULD FAITHFULLY FULFILL ANY GUARANTEE GIVEN. WE SHOULD KNOW THAT WHEN DISCUSSIONS WERE RESUMED IN GENEVA WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT CHANGE IN SOVIET POSITION AS THEY COULD NOT GO BEYOND PROPOSALS ALREADY PUT FORWARD. HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION TO BE THAT IF THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT IN GENEVA THERE WOULD BE NO SUMMIT CONFERENCE. IF THIS WERE SO, VERY WELL,

SECRET



REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

-3-2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW

OUR OCCUPATION RIGHTS WOULD CEASE TO EXIST. HE KEPT HIS TEMPER WHEN I INQUIRED HOW HE COULD RECONCILE THIS STATEMENT WITH HIS PREVIOUS REMARKS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE THE SOVIET GOVT ATTACHED TO KEEPING ITS WORD. THIS LED TO A LONG AND INCONCLUSIVE ARGUMENT ABOUT WHO WAS TO BLAME FOR BREAKDOWN OF FOUR POWER COOPERATION IN GERNAMY. HE POINTED TO OUR CONCLUSION OF SEPARATE TREATY WITH JAPAN. THEN I SAID WE HAD RESERVED SOVIET RIGHTS HE REPLIED THAT THEY HAD BEEN KICKED OUT OF ALLIED COUNCIL AND WE HAD ESTABLISHED MILITARY BASES IN JAPAN. MIKOYAN INTERJECTED THEY WOULD GIVE US SAME DEAL ON GERMANY AS WE HAD GIVEN THEM ON JAPAN.

THOMPSON

RV/

SECRET

THE GRASSYD

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NNO 887404

By 44 NARA, Date 1-8-40

-PREPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

35-M Action

SECRET

Control: 19484

EUR

FROM: MOSCOW

Redd: JUNE 26, 1959

10:57 AM

SS

TO:

Secretary of State

NO:

2665, JUNE 26/2 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

610

C INR H

PRIORITY

RMR

SENT DEPARTMENT 2665; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 443, PARIS 425, BONN 339.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

KHRUSHCHEV ASKED WHAT WAS WRONG WITH SOVIET PROPOBAL & HE EMPHASIZED THAT WEST BERLIN AND ITS POPULATION WAS OF NO IMPORTANCE TO SOVIET UNION. I SAID I COULD BELTEVE THIS BUT BERLIN WAS CLEARLY IMPORTANT TO EAST GERMANS WHO WANTED TO ABSORB IT AND SOVIET PROPOSALS SECTION TO US CLEARLY DESIGNED TO FACILITITE THIS OBJECTIVE.

KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO SECRETARY HERTER'S SPEECH WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS AN INCORRECT STATEMENT OF THE POSITION. GROMYKO HAD NOT INTENDED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT BUT WOULD NOW BE OBLIGED TO PUT RECORD STRAIGHT.

I REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER STATEMENT THAT SOVIET UNION HAD MADE ITS MAXIMUM OFFER AND SAID I THOUGHT SAME WAS TRUE OF WEST ALTHOUGH VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR OFFER WERE POSSIBLE. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS WE SHOULD CANCEL THE MEETING. I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIM BUT MERELY TRYING TO EXPLAIN MY UNDERSTANDING OF MY GOVT'S POSITION. I EXPLAINED THIS IN SOME DETAIL REFERRING TO SOVIET ACTION IN DISPOSIING OF EAST BERLIN AND NOW TRYING TO MOVE IN ON WEST BERLIN. WHEN I OUTLINED THE CONCESSIONS WE HAD MADE AND THE DISTANCE WE HAD GONE TO MEET HIS POSITION HE SAID HE HAD CAREFULLY EXAMINED OUR PROPOSAL

CLASSFIED FILE

SECRET

PERMANENT
RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THE COPY IS PROHIBITED.

WHICH DID

Authority NND 887404

Dy B6 MARA, Dato 1/1/9

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL APCHINES

SECRET

-2- 2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW.


WHICH DID IN FACT CONTAIN MANY CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS.
IT WAS NOT BAD EXCEPT FOR ONE FACT AND THAT WAS THAT
IT WAS TO OPERATE UNTIL GERMAN REUNIFICATION WHICH WAS
COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. IT MIGHT BE ALL RIGHT AS
AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT TO OPERATE UNTIL APEACE TREATY
COULD BE DRAWN UP AND CONCLUDED.

I REFERRED TO A REMARK HE HAD MADE THAT OUR TROOPS IN BERLIN HAD NO MILITARY VALUE AND THAT EVEN IF WE HAD 100,000 THERE THEY WOULD BE WIPED OUT IMMEDIATELY IN THE EVENT OF WAR. I ASKED WHY WAS HE THEN SO ANXIOUS TO GET RID OF THEM. HE REPLIED THAT WHILE THEY WOULD HAVE NO MILITARY VALUE IN THE EVENT OF WAR THEY DID HAVE A MILITARY VALUE NOW. GROMYKO EXPLAINED THAT SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN BERLIN OPERATED UNDER THE PROTECTION OF WESTERN TROOPS. IF PEACE TREATY WERE SIGNED THEY COULD NO LONGER FULFILL THIS FUNCTION. I SAID THIS INDICATED THAT SOVIET UNION OR GDR WOULD DECIDE WHICH ORGANIZATIONS WERE LEGITIMATE AND WHICH WERE NOT. THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF BERLIN AND SHOWED CLEARLY WHERE SOVIET PROPOSALS WOULD LEAD. KHRUSHCHEV SAID THIS WAS AN EXAGGERATED INTERPRETATION.

I ALSO REFERRED TO THE LACK OF RECIPROCITY IN SOVIET PROPOSALS ON PROPAGANDA ETC. KHRUSHCHEV SAID IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL ACTIVITIES IN EAST GERMANY AND ALLOW BOWN TO BE FREE TO CONTINUE THEM. I SAID WE RECOGNIZED THIS AND WERE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH IT BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT ARRANGEMENTS ON THIS MATTER THAT APPLIED TO WEST BERLIN BUT NOT EAST BERLIN.

KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO HOLDING OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN WEST BERLIN AS A PROVOCATIVE ACT BUT NOT IN ANY MANNER SUGGESTING SOVIETS INTENDED TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT.

SECRET



SECRET

-3- 2665, June 26, 2 PM(SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW.

KHRUSHCHEV THEN TOLD ANECDOTE TO ILLUSTRATE THESES I WAS MERELY REPEATING OLD ARGUMENTS.

HARRIMAN EMPHASIZED STRONGLY THAT BOTH PARTIES IN US SUPPORTED PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON BERLIN. KHRUSHCHEV SUGGESTED THAT WHILE POLITICAL PARTIES MIGHT BE IN AGREEMENT SOME OF OUR PEOPLE WERE NOT BUT HE RECOGNIZED THEY HAD TO DEAL WITH OUR GOVT. KHRUSHCHEV CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY SAYING WE SHOULD WORK OUT AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD LEAD TO A PEACE TREATY AND HE SUGGESTED THIS COULD BE DONE IN A WAY TO AVOID ANY ASPECT OF AN ULTIMATUM.

UNLESS DEPT PERCEIVES OBJECTION I PROPOSE INFORM MY FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES OF THIS CONVERSATION.

THOMPSON

VF/20

SECRET

